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Stephen Lee*
For over twenty years, our immigration laws have required employers to
screen their workforces for “unauthorized” immigrants. But rather than punish
employers for failing to carry out these duties, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has worked with employers to identify unauthorized workers for
removal—even where it is abundantly clear that employers are reporting the very
workers they unlawfully hired in the first place, and are doing so to retaliate
against workers who assert labor and employment rights. How can a law that
was designed to punish employers be used to reward them? This Article attempts
to explain this counterintuitive result. Although the DHS-employer relationship
appears to be contentious and antagonistic, that relationship can often be highly
collaborative and mutually beneficial, where the DHS overlooks employer
indiscretions in exchange for help identifying potentially removable immigrants.
In this way, employers resemble other immigration screeners, like airport
inspectors and state and local law enforcement officers, who assist the DHS by
winnowing down to a manageable size the pool of potentially removable
immigrants. This Article therefore argues that employers should be regulated as
screeners where employers should be punished for using their screening
authority beyond the scope of its intended use, which often means employers
using reporting and the threat of reporting to avoid liability for labor and
employment violations. Thus, while our immigration laws contemplate punishing
employers at the front end for who they hire, this Article argues our laws should
also punish employers at the back end for who they report. As one set of
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remedies, this Article proposes subjecting employers to possible audits if they
report workers to the DHS, and applying the exclusionary rule against complicit
immigration officials.
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INTRODUCTION
The latest figures place the unauthorized immigrant population at about 12
million. 1 Meanwhile, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 2 boasts
that it removed over 275,000 noncitizens in 2007. 3 How does the DHS decide
which of our nation’s 12 million unauthorized immigrants will be removed and
which will remain? How do unauthorized immigrants enter the removal
pipeline? Who actually makes these immigration decisions? While scholars
have offered rich and textured analyses of the ever-expanding grounds for
removing immigrants, surprisingly little attention has been paid to immigration
screeners—the persons and institutions that assist the DHS in identifying
candidates for removal. This Article focuses on one undertheorized site of

1. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 1, available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf.
2. Prior to 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was the agency that
carried out sanctions and workplace enforcement, and so my use of “INS” refers to that era
of immigration enforcement. In 2003, the functions of the INS were transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107296, 116 Stat. 2135.
3. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT: PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY AND UPHOLDING PUBLIC SAFETY, at iv (2007),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/ice07ar_final.pdf. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) is housed within the DHS.
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immigration screening and one particularly problematic set of immigration
screeners: the workplace and our nation’s employers. 4
For over twenty years, our immigration policy has effectively conditioned
access to work on proof of citizenship or lawful status. Passed in 1986, the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) prohibits our nation’s employers
from hiring anyone other than citizens or those otherwise “authorized” to work.
It effectuates this mandate by requiring employers to screen their workforces
and “verify” the immigration status of their workers. 5 Thus, along with port-ofentry inspectors, international carriers, asylum officers, and an increasing
number of state and local law enforcement officers, employers assist the DHS
in a screening capacity by identifying those immigrants who, in their judgment,
ought to be reported to DHS officials for removal. Screeners in effect winnow
down the universe of potentially unauthorized immigrants to a manageable
size.
For immigration purposes, our nation’s employers remain a significant and
significantly misunderstood group of immigration decision makers. The sheer
number of employers makes them significant. The number of public
immigration officials within the DHS—the public agency charged with the duty
of making immigration-screening decisions—is approximately 31,500. 6 But
4. Employers have not, however, been undercriticized. Indeed, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, has generated an
impressive body of work addressing the different ways in which the statute has proven to be
ineffective. See, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955; Martha F. Davis,
Lucas Guttentag & Allan H. Wernick, Report of the Committee on Immigration and
Nationality Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York: An Analysis of
Discrimination Resulting from Employer Sanctions and a Call for Repeal, 26 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 711 (1989); Cecelia Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343 (1994); Jeffrey Manns, Private
Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
887; Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor
Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345 (2001); Huyen Pham,
The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777 (2008); Maurice A. Roberts
& Stephen Yale-Loehr, Employers as Junior Immigration Inspectors: The Impact of the
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, 21 INT’L LAW. 1013 (1987); Juliet Stumpf &
Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration Law: One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2002); Michael J. Wishnie,
Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 193.
5. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359.
6. ICE and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) are the
divisions within the DHS responsible for handling the majority of immigration-related
decisions. According to the DHS, in 2007 ICE employed more than 16,500 people and
USCIS employed more than 15,000 people. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
USCIS ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 3 (2007), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/USCIS_annual_report_part1.pdf;
U.S.
IMMIGRATIONS & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 3, at 1. The total number of public
officials is at most 31,500 because USCIS employs both “federal and contract employees,”
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because our immigration laws require all employers to verify the immigration
status of their employees, even focusing on just a handful of the industries that
have traditionally relied on immigrant labor reveals a startling reality: within
the construction and manufacturing/production industries, for example, no
fewer than 1.1 million employers—private entities—must screen their
employees to ascertain and verify immigration status. 7 This means that an atbest-loosely-organized group of private screeners is effectively deciding which
immigrants in the workplace can stay and which should be reported for
removal.
Despite the reach of their influence over immigration matters in the
workplace, employers have nonetheless remained significantly misunderstood
as decision makers. Employers are not uncommonly seen as the targets of
regulation, where the primary regulatory challenge involves properly
calibrating the level of enforcement against employers to deter them from
hiring unauthorized immigrants. 8 This is not entirely surprising given IRCA’s
logic. Like other third-party liability schemes, it seeks to disrupt what can often
be a collusive relationship. Many employers seek out low-wage unskilled labor,
and many unauthorized immigrants in turn seek out work opportunities to
support themselves and their families. But while it is true that IRCA formally
prohibits employers from hiring unauthorized immigrants under threat of civil
and criminal sanction, it has been so infrequently enforced that employers can
escape detection in all but the most egregious circumstances. 9 As a result, the
employer-worker relationship, while collusive, has become asymmetrical:
unencumbered by the fear of being punished, employers can threaten to report
workers for removal, whereas workers do not possess any similar ability to
blow the whistle on employers. Therefore, in many instances, employers and

demonstrating the extent to which public entities have come to rely on private actors. U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra, at 3.
7. According to a recent report, in 2004 the six most immigrant-dependent industries,
in decreasing order of dependence, were: (1) farming, fishing, and forestry; (2) construction;
(3) building and grounds maintenance; (4) production (manufacturing); (5) food preparation
and serving; and (6) transportation. See RANDY CAPPS, KARINA FORTUNY & MICHAEL FIX,
TRENDS IN THE LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT LABOR FORCE, 2000-2005, at 7 tbl.4 (2007),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411426_Low-Wage_Immigrant_
Labor.pdf. According to the U.S. Census, in 2004 there were 760,400 and 339,100
“Construction” and “Manufacturing” establishments, respectively, which comes to just under
1.1 million total establishments. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2008 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, TABLE 736: ESTABLISHMENTS, EMPLOYEES, AND PAYROLL BY EMPLOYMENT-SIZE
CLASS AND INDUSTRY: 2000 TO 2004 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/
statab/2008/tables/08s0736.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Manns, supra note 4, at 931 (“The fundamental problem is that both
employers of low-wage workers and undocumented aliens share a strong economic interest
in engaging in formal compliance yet substantive subversion of the verification process.”);
Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1735-36 (2006).
9. See infra Part II.A.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1272238

S LEE 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103

March 2009]

4/25/2009 1:46 PM

PRIVATE IMMIGRATION SCREENING

1107

employers alone decide which unauthorized immigrants in the workplace can
remain, and which will be reported for removal.
What has been the result? The immediate harms have been harsh and
increasingly apparent. Within industries traditionally dependent on immigrant
labor, employers recruit and hire unauthorized workers, and use their de facto
immunity from sanctions to negotiate low wages, disregard workplace
protections, and otherwise suppress worker dissent. Moreover, with increasing
frequency, employers seem to be contacting the DHS to request that it inspect
their own workplaces and detain and remove the same unauthorized workers
they recruited and hired in the first place. And while some may reach out to the
DHS as an attempt to carry out their screening duties in good faith, the growing
anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that many employers report workers
in retaliation for unauthorized immigrants’ attempting to assert their labor and
employment rights. Employers, therefore, possess a great deal of discretion
over whom they hire and whom they report, and in both instances it appears
they exercise that discretion in a manner that elevates their interest in
maximizing profit over the interests of advancing the goals of our nation’s
immigration and labor and employment laws. As Michael Wishnie explains,
IRCA’s perversity stems from “a law-breaking employer [who] may invoke the
formidable powers of the government’s law enforcement apparatus to terrorize
its workers and suppress worker dissent under threat of deportation.” 10
Though we know what employers are supposed to do (verify the
immigration status of their workers), and what they are instead more likely to
do (hire unauthorized workers and threaten removal to gain a bargaining
advantage), we know little about why the DHS continues to rely on employer
“tips” and “leads,” and we know even less about what the long-term effects will
be on immigration. Finding a solution to the problem of exploitation requires,
therefore, answering a whole series of questions that move us beyond a onedimensional understanding of employers as regulatory targets engaging in
lawless behavior.
Answering those questions requires us to first take account of the way
IRCA has actually been implemented. I employ the following diagram for
expositional help.

10. Wishnie, supra note 4, at 216.
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Figure 1. Comparing IRCA’s Design and its Implementation
IRCA’s Design
Regulator(s)

Regulatory Target(s)

INS

Employers

IRCA’s Implementation
INS/DHS

Unauthorized
Immigrants

Employers

Unauthorized
Immigrants

Taking seriously this “regulatory retriangulation,” 11 I provide in this
Article a descriptive account of how employers have become not just agents of
exploitation, but also agents of the State. I want to suggest that our nation’s
employers are best understood as private immigration screeners 12 who identify
potentially unauthorized immigrants within their workforces for removal. Just
as port-of-entry inspectors screen for ineligible entrants, and state and local law
enforcement officers screen investigatory targets for removable noncitizens,
our nation’s employers screen their workforces for immigrants that lack
authorization and are otherwise removable. Therefore, the DHS persists in
working with (rather than completely against) employers because they provide
a variety of screening services. Some of those services attach through the
compulsion or encouragement of law, like examining documents and
consulting databases to verify immigration status. 13 Other services, like

11. While others have made passing note of this dynamic, I seek to fully elaborate the
role transition undertaken by employers. See Nessel, supra note 4, at 360 (noting that while
“IRCA was intended to punish employers” many INS initiatives have targeted only
workers).
12. Huyen Pham has made an important first contribution by analyzing the costs and
benefits of what she describes as the private enforcement of immigration laws. See Pham,
supra note 4, at 783. But Pham expressly leaves open some of the theoretical questions this
Article endeavors to answer:
This Article focuses on the efficacy of the shifting, but the phenomenon of private
enforcement also raises similar legal and political questions: are governments also shifting
political accountability for immigration law enforcement? If a private party violates civil
rights laws, who should be held responsible for damages—the private party, the government
requiring the private enforcement, both or none? Finally, should private parties be
compensated in some way for their new enforcement responsibilities?

Id. at 783-84.
13. See Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the
Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1098-99 (2008); see also Press Release,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Highlights Best Practices for Maintaining Legal Workforces
(July 26, 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0966.shtm
(explaining that DHS policy encourages employers to join the “Basic Pilot Employment
Verification” program, which provides employers access to an internet-based federal
database to help determine the work eligibility of their employees).
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reporting the presence of unauthorized immigrants to the DHS 14 and
coordinating workplace inspections and raids, 15 have emerged out of an
evolved regulatory practice and culture of collaboration. But in any event, all
these services permit employers to shape the conditions under which
unauthorized immigrants remain in the United States and define the conditions
triggering DHS detention and removal.
Having painted a descriptive reality where the DHS and our nation’s
employers collaboratively screen for unauthorized immigrants, I then turn to
the normative implications that arise from such an arrangement. In particular, I
focus on the consequences of this collaboration and argue that this informal
regulatory partnership has exacted both legal and democratic costs. The legal
costs are straightforward and concrete. Permitting employers to report—and
use the threat of reporting against—workers effectively prevents workers from
asserting labor and employment rights they would otherwise be entitled to
assert. Such a practice also incurs democratic costs, which are no less troubling.
Employer screening that proceeds on a self-serving basis incentivizes
immigrant workers to embrace docility and avoid activity that draws attention,
such as participating in a union drive or pressing claims for overtime pay. But
the workplace remains one of the few social institutions where immigrant
adults can encounter and develop meaningful relationships with nonfamily
citizens, becoming in the process more integrated into their surrounding
communities and larger society. Employer screening has therefore diminished
the capacity of the workplace to provide more than just an opportunity to earn a
paycheck. It injects the threat of removal as one more set of costs workers must
bear in attempting to foster a sense of community and solidarity and
investment.
Part of my ambition is to unsettle our notions surrounding the type of
behavior we ought to reward when screening for unauthorized immigrants.
Some have argued that unauthorized immigrants, who work hard and endure
great difficulties, should, after a number of years, be permitted to regularize
their status. This type of immigration policy rewards those who avoid attracting
attention to themselves, and indeed, some have rationalized the removal of
criminal noncitizens—who, at least in principle, have attracted substantial
attention to themselves by virtue of their convictions—on precisely this
ground. 16 The case of employer screening, however, suggests that rewarding
this type of behavior in the workplace can have perverse consequences.
Because employers are often regulated by workers who either report workplace
violations to enforcement agencies, like the Department of Labor, or bring
enforcement actions themselves, a screening system that rewards immigrant
14. See Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: The Border Crossed Us: Current Issues in
Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 389, 389 (2004).
15. See Aldana, supra note 13, at 1100.
16. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law,
59 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2007).
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workers who (quite reasonably) lay low to avoid removal, only encourages
labor and employment violations and fosters a culture of lawlessness. This
raises the troubling specter that employers will use unauthorized immigrants to
diminish workplace protections for all workers, and that unauthorized
immigrants will be discouraged from developing bonds with citizens within the
workplace, one of the few social institutions that facilitates the integration of
adult immigrants.
The balance of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains and
develops the idea of employers as immigration screeners. After briefly
summarizing IRCA’s ambition of transforming employers into immigration
screeners by regulating whom employers hired, this Part then marries this
narrative to the prevailing scholarship surrounding immigration screening. The
Part concludes by turning away from IRCA’s design and toward an exploration
of how it has actually been implemented. Here, I trace out the consequences of
the DHS’s virtual nonregulation of employer hiring decisions. I explain how
this regulatory strategy has impoverished the workplace, both because it
effectively suppresses the assertion of legal rights for labor and employment
violations, and because it diminishes the democracy-enhancing potential of the
workplace and obstructs the integration of immigrants into their surrounding
communities.
Part II delves into the origins of the DHS’s contemporary practice of
nonenforcement. By disentangling the web of enforcement realities, rationales,
and collaborations running throughout the workplace, I hope to explain why
and how a law that was designed to punish employers has been implemented in
a way that rewards them. Part III advances my prescriptive claims. Having
zeroed in on the legal and democratic harms flowing from the workplace, this
Part argues in favor of developing immigration policies that broaden their
regulatory focus. Rather than focusing only on whom employers hire, I argue in
favor of broadening our regulatory focus to account for whom employers report
to the DHS for removal. Doing so will keep employers and complicit low-level
DHS officials more accountable and will send the proper signals: namely that
employers ought not use immigration laws to serve their own goals to the
detriment of labor and employment protections and the workplace’s potential to
strengthen our democracy. I explore audits and the exclusionary rule as
concrete examples of this shift towards greater accountability. I then conclude.
I. EMPLOYERS AS IMMIGRATION SCREENERS

A. IRCA: Screening Out “Unauthorized” Workers
Laws requiring employers to screen their workforces for unauthorized
immigrants have appeared at the federal, state, and local levels in some form
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for more than thirty years. 17 Though these laws differ in minor respects, they
all operate in roughly the same manner: by prohibiting employers from hiring
unauthorized immigrants, and by imposing verification duties on employers,
where they must examine certain documents and determine whether their
employees are authorized to work in the United States.
In 1971, California passed the nation’s first employer sanctions law. 18
Under the threat of criminal penalties, California forbade employers from
“knowingly” employing a noncitizen who was not entitled to lawful residence
in the United States if such employment had “an adverse effect” on U.S.
citizens and other lawful workers. 19 Employers were also subject to civil
actions. Such proceedings could be initiated by anyone. 20 Before then,
employers in California were free to hire unauthorized workers, and they did so
openly and unapologetically. 21
California’s employer sanction laws eventually made their way to the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1975, when several lawful migrant farmworkers sought to
enjoin employers from hiring unauthorized workers. The lower courts had
uniformly concluded that California’s employer sanctions regime
unconstitutionally encroached upon Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate

17. Scholars have made only passing reference to the idea that employers make
immigration-related screening decisions regarding their workforce. See David A. Martin,
Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 546
(2007) (characterizing IRCA and its verification requirements as requiring employers to
engage in “immigration screening”); Stumpf & Friedman, supra note 4, at 137 (noting that
IRCA “effectively makes employers parties to enforcement of the immigration laws
affecting the labor market. Employers themselves become the primary method of screening
the labor pool for employees that the State has not authorized to work” (citation omitted));
Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance 15 (Harvard Law
Sch., Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-12, 2008) (noting that employer sanctions
statutes encourage employers to screen aliens for work permits and penalize employers when
they fail to perform this function).
18. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (1983) (repealed 1988). Eleven other states and one
city followed suit, including Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Vermont, Virginia, and Las Vegas. See KITTY
CALAVITA, CALIFORNIA’S “EMPLOYER SANCTIONS”: THE CASE OF THE DISAPPEARING LAW 4
n.3 (1982). I focus on California because the decisional law addressing this particular preIRCA employer sanction law is well developed, and thus provides a useful window into the
motivations, concerns, and anxieties of that period.
19. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a)-(b) (1983) (repealed 1988).
20. Id. § 2805(c).
21. In the months leading up to section 2805’s passage, the California Courts of
Appeal rendered several decisions denying relief to citizen and otherwise lawful migrant
farmworkers. Though courts consistently ruled against plaintiffs on the theory that regulating
immigrants was a responsibility best left to the federal government, they often expressed
dismay over what they understood to be a gaping hole in our nation’s immigration laws. See,
e.g., Larez v. Oberti, 100 Cal. Rptr. 57 (Ct. App. 1972); Cobos v. Mello-Dy Ranch, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 131 (Ct. App. 1971). Although the decision in Larez was rendered after section 2805
was passed, the challenged activities occurred before its passage. See Larez, 100 Cal. Rptr. at
63 & n.5.
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immigration. 22 The Supreme Court reversed in De Canas v. Bica, holding
California’s law to be valid and concluding that Congress had not intended for
the “complete ouster of state power” in this area of regulation. 23 From a
constitutional standpoint, De Canas is typically cited for the proposition that
state and local—and not just federal—authorities possess the authority to
regulate unauthorized immigrants. But its broader juridical implications
reaffirm the principle that within our nation’s immigration regime, public
entities may continue to structure private relationships to achieve immigration
ends. 24
In 1986, Congress passed IRCA, which created for the first time a federal
employer sanctions scheme. 25 IRCA prohibited employers from “knowingly”
hiring immigrants who were not authorized to work. Importantly, it imposed
screening responsibilities on employers, requiring them to verify the
immigration status of their workers and to keep records on whom they hired.
Anyone who secures a job in the United States must fill out the by-nowfamiliar I-9 form. This form verifies that the employee is authorized to work in
the United States, must be completed within three days of hire, and must be
supported by documentation establishing the worker’s identity. 26 Under IRCA,
employers face civil and criminal fines for failing to carry out these screening
duties.
Congress transferred screening authority to employers because
employment opportunities were understood to be “job magnets” drawing in a
22. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353-54 (1976).
23. Id. at 357. Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that although
the immigration power was federal in nature, states retained some authority to pass at least
some measures affecting immigrants. California’s decision to regulate immigrants, the Court
explained, did not automatically become a “constitutionally proscribed regulation of
immigration” at least where such regulation had “some purely speculative and indirect
impact on immigration.” Id. at 355. Thus, it was perfectly fine that California prohibited the
hiring of noncitizens who “have no federal right to employment within the country” in order
to “strengthen its economy.” Id.
24. The last time state and local governments engaged in a coordinated campaign to
structure private relationships for immigration purposes was during the early part of the
twentieth century when several western states passed “alien land laws” prohibiting “aliens
ineligible to citizenship” from obtaining any interest in land ownership. See Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934); Cockrill v.
California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O’Brien, 263
U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S.
197 (1923).
25. IRCA also expressly overruled employer sanctions laws passed by state and local
entities, including California’s. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (“The provisions of
[IRCA] preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than
through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for
employment, unauthorized aliens.”). For excellent summaries of the tumultuous events
leading up to the passage of IRCA and the difficulties of placating the diverse set of
competing interests, see ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY
IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 354-75 (2006) and Wishnie, supra note 4.
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(C)(i)-(ii) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)-(b) (2009).
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constant stream of unauthorized migration. Thus, targeting employers was
central to Congress’s strategy for regulating unauthorized immigration. 27
Employer sanctions prohibit immigrants from working without authorization
and prohibit employers from hiring workers without first verifying the
proffered documentation. Conditioning U.S. jobs on proof of authorization, so
the logic went, would deter immigrants from coming to the United States for
work reasons, encourage those that were here without meaningful job
opportunities to return home, and over the long term reduce the rate of
unauthorized migration. IRCA therefore created a segmented but seamless
chain of liability. As the Supreme Court has noted, Congress created a
sprawling statute putting both employers and workers on the hook by making it
“impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United
States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional
policies.” 28
B. The Challenges of Immigration Screening
If employers perform screening duties, where do they fit within the larger
universe of immigration screeners? In what ways do their challenges resemble
those of other screeners, and in what ways do they stand apart? What kinds of
behavior does employer screening reward and what does it punish?
In sizing up employer screening, it is useful to remind ourselves that
nation’s immigration laws orchestrate what has aptly been characterized as the
project of “national self-definition.” 29 At the highest level of abstraction,
members select new members, and in the process argue about, negotiate,
remember, and ultimately decide who “we” are as Americans. 30 And while
many social institutions are swimming in the sort of political and legal
discourse that invites arguments about “who we are” (schools, marriage, and
the military come to mind), none quite so literally implicates the “we” question
as do the laws regulating access to immigration and citizenship. This is why
screening matters—it operationalizes our abstract ideas about who we are.
Within legal scholarship, few have addressed the empirical aspects of
immigration screening. In a series of articles, Janet Gilboy thoughtfully
addresses the challenges of screening entrants at international airports, perhaps
the most obvious and familiar example of immigration screening. Primary line
inspectors in airports must examine a traveler’s documents and determine in a
short period of time whether the entrant is eligible to enter on the basis of those
27. See Wishnie, supra note 4, at 195-96.
28. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148 (2002) (emphasis
added).
29. Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional
Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1944 (1996).
30. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 1991).
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documents. 31 If the documents are valid and permit entry, the entrant is
screened in. But if the entrant arouses suspicion, the inspector directs the
entrant to secondary inspection where immigration officials can engage in more
extensive questioning and perhaps search the entrant’s baggage. Thus, for many
entrants, primary inspectors constitute the main screening hurdle to be cleared
in gaining entrance into the United States. 32
Primary inspectors have to make very quick screening decisions and
determine which of the hundreds of entrants they inspect daily are ineligible to
enter. They look for signs that the entrant is not who she says she is. For
example, an immigration agent may be more likely to screen in an entrant who
can produce a letter of employment from a well-known employer than she is an
entrant who is associated with an obscure one, or who produces no letter at
all. 33 Similarly, an inspector might think nothing of a traveler fumbling the
names of the relatives she is visiting, unless that traveler is a young woman,
31. See Janet A. Gilboy, Deciding Who Gets In: Decisionmaking by Immigration
Inspectors, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 571, 590-91 (1991) [hereinafter Gilboy, Deciding Who
Gets In]. Under screening procedures, the primary inspector either admits the entrant, or if
her suspicions are aroused, directs the entrant to secondary inspection, where the secondary
inspector can make a more thorough and comprehensive inquiry into the entrant’s identity
and motives. For a more detailed description, see id. at 574-77. Gilboy has written
extensively about the regulatory challenges that flow from immigration inspection in the
airport context. See Janet A. Gilboy, Compelled Third-Party Participation in the Regulatory
Process: Legal Duties, Culture, and Noncompliance, 20 LAW & POL’Y 135 (1998)
[hereinafter Gilboy, Compelled Third-Party Participation]; Janet A. Gilboy, Implications of
“Third-Party” Involvement in Enforcement: The INS, Illegal Travelers, and International
Airlines, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 505 (1997) [hereinafter Gilboy, Implications of “ThirdParty” Involvement].
32. To help deter these sorts of unauthorized entries, immigration officials enlist the
help of airlines, which, much like employers, are required to examine and verify the travel
documents of their passengers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2006). Airline sanction laws bear the
same structural features of those creating employer sanctions—Congress has imposed a set
of obligations onto a private entity, which is charged with the duty of carrying out a service
traditionally carried out by a public entity. Airlines are fined for failing to determine that a
passenger possessed improper documentation for entry into the United States, and in
addition, face the responsibility of transporting the undesirable entrant out of the United
States. See Gilboy, Implications of “Third Party” Involvement, supra note 31, at 509. The
offending airline also incurs the costs associated with detention and custody, to the extent
such costs arise. See id.
33. Gilboy notes that primary immigration inspectors exhibit a tendency to screen in
entrants when they can furnish an employment letter from “respectable companies.” She
explains:
In these cases, there is a tendency for inspectors to rely on the company’s own screening of
job candidates. This is essential “surrogate screening,” in which an earlier institution’s
decisionmaking is substituted for a fresh screening. Thus, decisions by other institutions, not
within the legal system, come to affect legal decisionmaking.

Gilboy, Deciding Who Gets In, supra note 31, at 592. In the airport screening context,
primary inspectors are well aware that it is their judgment that makes them valuable, and
what subjects them to promotion or punishment. They are incentivized to overadmit with
low-risk cases because “their judgment is likely to be called into question if they refer a
series of perceived ‘nothing’ cases to secondary inspectors.” Id. at 584.
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from an Eastern European country with a burgeoning black market for overseas
“nannies.” 34
Immigration screening also takes place in the interior of the United States.
For example, some scholars have noted that state and local law enforcement
officers are increasingly providing screening services as our immigration
regime fortifies its ties to the criminal justice system. 35 As the DHS has shifted
its removal priorities towards criminal noncitizens, it has increasingly relied on
the help of state and local law enforcement officers, who can cross-check the
names of motorists in a computer database to ascertain whether those motorists
have any continuing immigration violations. 36 Other jurisdictions have
attempted to impose similar screening duties onto landlords and university
officials. 37
The workplace has long served as a site for screening immigrants, though
this phenomenon has largely been appreciated within the context of the formal
immigration system. Every year about 160,000 people immigrate each year
because an employer has served as a sponsor, 38 highlighting the extent to
which the workplace functions as a place where immigrants are screened into
the United States and identified as potential citizens on the basis of their skills,
talents, and efforts as workers. While Congress may be interested in identifying
immigrants who might contribute to American workplaces and eventually
become citizens, the costs required to undertake such an endeavor render
impractical any policy that relies only on Congress, agencies, and other public
entities. Therefore, Congress devolves some screening authority to employers
who, in their capacity as current members of the national community, may
sponsor new members, and in the process bear the costs of growing the polity.
Employers seeking to sponsor and screen in employees (and not the State) must
34. See id. at 590-91. In this “nanny” scenario, the inspector would direct the entrant to
secondary inspection, where the secondary inspector could make a more thorough and
comprehensive inquiry into the entrant’s identity and motives. For a more detailed
description of the screening procedures, see id. at 574-77.
35. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 385 (2006); see also Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local
Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004).
36. Wishnie, supra note 35, at 1095-96.
37. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037,
2060-65 (2008).
38. Another approximately 650,000 persons immigrate because a family member has
sponsored them. See MIGRATION POLICY INST., FACT SHEET NO. 16, ANNUAL IMMIGRATION
TO THE UNITED STATES: THE REAL NUMBERS 1 (2007), [hereinafter ANNUAL IMMIGRATION
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS16_USImmigration_
051807.pdf. This is unsurprising given that one of the central goals of our immigration laws
is to unite families. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and
the Limits of Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 358 (“Immigration laws are not blind to the
rights and needs of families; indeed, family reunification is a central part of United States
immigration law.”); see also Hiroshi Motomura, We Asked for Workers, but Families Came:
Time, Law, and the Family in Immigration and Citizenship, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 103
(2006).
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spend time and money to review education credentials, skill sets, and
references. 39 Just as important, employers are better able to evaluate such
criteria. Microsoft and Oracle can more effectively identify competent highskilled workers than can the agency for United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services. From the State’s perspective, transferring screening
responsibilities to employers provides a cost-effective way to winnow down the
universe of potential immigrants to a manageable size.
While immigration admission laws allow employers to screen immigrants
to identify potential citizens, IRCA simultaneously requires them to screen
their workforces for potentially unauthorized immigrants. While employers
carry out both kinds of screening services, screening for unauthorized
immigrants presents its own set of challenges. For one thing, screening for
unauthorized immigrants presents a qualitatively different challenge from the
type of screening that employers practice within the formal system. Identifying
immigrants who might contribute to the workplace as legal permanent residents
entails screening in candidates for admission, which requires them to review
criteria—like skill sets and credentials and work history—over which
employers possess some measure of expertise. By contrast, the task of
identifying those immigrants already within the workplace who are
unauthorized requires screening out candidates for removal, which effectively
boils down to reviewing and comparing identification documents, a challenge
that employers are not particularly well suited to carry out. 40 Given this
distinction, employers who screen for unauthorized immigrants in the
workplace, in many ways, have more in common with airport inspectors
screening for suspicious entrants and state and local law enforcement officers
screening for removable criminal convictsthan they do with those employers
who screen immigrants for admission. 41 Whereas employers are well suited to
evaluate résumé criteria, they (nor law enforcement officers, landlords, and
university officials for that matter) are particularly well suited to differentiate
between authentic and fraudulent work documents.
39. Those seeking to sponsor and screen-in family members must similarly internalize
the cost of dependency, caretaking, and integration responsibilities. Family law scholars
have developed this idea in the context of regulating families. See Martha L.A. Fineman,
Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2187
(1995) (explaining that caretaking responsibilities have been privatized, so that “[t]he
ideology of the private family mandates that the unit nurture its members and provide for
them economically”); Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal
Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 394-95 (2008)
(“[P]erhaps the most important function that the family serves is the privatization of care for
dependent members, usually children. The family—and parents, particularly—takes on this
task, so that it is not primarily the public responsibility of the state.” (internal citations
omitted)).
40. Importantly, some immigrants who are already within the United States can in
certain instances adjust their status to that of a legal permanent resident. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(i) (2006).
41. See Stumpf, supra note 35, at 385; Wishnie, supra note 35.
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Further complicating matters is the sheer heterogeneity of the unauthorized
population. Recent studies estimate that about 1 to 1.5 million noncitizens
remain in the United States under a “twilight status”—they have satisfied all of
the requirements to become lawful permanent residents but must wait for their
paperwork to be processed. 42 Moreover, unauthorized status by itself does not
inexorably lead to the conclusion that a particular immigrant is necessarily
inadmissible as a candidate for permanent residence and citizenship. For
example, certain forms of relief, like cancellation of removal, require that
unauthorized immigrants show among other things that they have been in the
United States continuously for a period of ten years. 43 Neither does a
noncitizen’s illegal status prevent her during the removal proceedings from
asserting a right to remain if return to her sending country would mean, for
example, she would be tortured or beaten on account of her religion. 44
Historical experience also demonstrates that Congress can and does regularize
the status of many noncitizens for a variety of reasons, either for humanitarian
purposes, 45 or as part of a larger attempt to reform our immigration laws, as it
did with IRCA. Against this reality, unauthorized immigrants in the workplace
face a powerful incentive to remain in the United States given that continuity of
presence lies at the heart of all of these unauthorized channels towards
citizenship.
This incentive to remain invisible stands in sharp contrast to the sorts of
behavior our formal immigration system rewards. To immigrate through formal
channels requires persistence, education, and creativity. As an immigrant,
admission through the employer-based visa system can only be secured by
exerting great effort in securing an employer in the United States who is willing
to sponsor you. Therefore, formal immigration rewards those immigrants who
actively engage and convince potential sponsors that they will make good
workers and thus good citizens. The opposite is true for immigration through
unauthorized channels. For unauthorized immigrants, once they enter or remain
in the United States, they are incentivized to blend into their environments.
They are incentivized to lay low, embrace subservience, and remain in the
shadows of their communities because they seek not to garner attention and
admission, but to avoid detection and removal. 46
42. See DAVID A. MARTIN, TWILIGHT STATUSES: A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION (Migration Policy Inst. ed. 2005), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_PB_6.05.pdf.
43. INA § 240A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2006).
44. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
45. See Motomura, supra note 37, at 2049 (identifying the Nicaraguan and Central
American Relief Act and Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act as examples of where
“previously unlawful migrants were brought into the lawful fold”).
46. I thank David Sklansky for sharing this observation with me. See Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982) (“Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry
into this country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment of
undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial ‘shadow population’ of
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To the extent that screening for unauthorized immigants is defensible as a
part of a larger interior enforcement strategy, that strategy’s defensibility
reaches its nadir in the workplace. For example, screening for unauthorized
immigrants within the United States’s interior has gained the most traction
applied to the criminal justice system. Adam Cox and Eric Posner suggest that,
rather than looking to an immigrant’s educational background or work
experience to determine admissibility, immigration judges quite rightly look to
an immigrant’s record of criminal convictions in determining whether that
immigrant will be removed. 47 In explaining why an ex post system might be
preferable to an ex ante system, Cox and Posner explain:
It is difficult to select desirable low-skilled workers on the basis of pre-entry
information. There are few objective criteria like education or prior work
history that would be reliable indicators of the ability of a low-skilled
immigrant worker to be a productive employee in the United States. By
contrast, an applicant’s post-entry employment record is highly relevant, often
fine-grained information. 48

They further argue that our unauthorized immigration system permits and
encourages immigration judges to look to the criminal justice system, which
provides a quick and easy (albeit contested and contestable) way for federal,
state, and local law enforcement officers to produce the relevant information
(convictions) upon which removal decisions might be based. 49 The benefit of
focusing enforcement efforts on noncitizens with criminal records is that it
allows the DHS to “better screen out undesired types by waiting for noncitizens
to commit crimes and expelling them.” 50
But employer tips and leads mean very little for a particular unauthorized
worker’s “desirability.” The logical force of an ex post system of screening
criminal noncitizens comes from what convictions presumably tell us about
those who are screened out. Convictions serve as proxies. Noncitizens who
commit crimes draw negative attention to themselves and are thus prime

illegal migrants—numbering in the millions—within our borders.”).
47. Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 809; see also Brown, supra note 17.
48. Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 847.
49. For a thoughtful analysis of the ways in which discretionary deportation produces
significant procedural consequences for those seeking relief from deportation, see Gerald L.
Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2006). Neuman notes that
this discretion resembles traditional prosecutorial forms of discretion, including the authority
to decide to bring or not bring removal actions against noncitizens. But it also includes forms
of discretion that are unique to immigration law, such as relief from deportation. See Nessel,
supra note 4, at 381 (“With respect to undocumented persons, the INS already relies upon
prosecutorial discretion in deciding whom actively to deport based upon an evaluation of the
size of the undocumented population, the economic and humanitarian reasons underlying
their entrance into this country, the economic necessity for low-wage workers in the United
States, and the limited funding available to the INS for use in deportation.” (internal citation
omitted)).
50. Cox & Posner, supra note 16, at 846-47.
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candidates for removal given their presumed “undesirability.” 51 This logic does
not translate so easily from the criminal justice system to the workplace. An
employer who reports unauthorized workers to the DHS has likely done so
because those workers have drawn negative attention to themselves—but it is
unlikely that the negative attention stems from the workers being shiftless or
unreliable or belligeren. Indeed, in those cases, an employer can simply
terminate those workers as it might, quite defensibly, terminate any workers
exhibiting those characteristics.
So the question becomes, what kind of behavior would prompt an
employer to go beyond termination and report the presence of unauthorized
workers to the DHS? I want to suggest that immigrants who draw attention to
themselves in this context do not carry the same presumption of
“undesirability.” It will not infrequently be the case that an immigrant who
draws attention to herself is doing so to correct labor and employment law
violations in the workplace. In other words, the kind of behavior prompting an
employer to report that worker to the DHS is the kind of behavior our labor and
employment laws encourage. Therefore, immigrant dissent in the workpalce
does not suggest lawlessness. Indeed, given employers’ incentives to cheat and
use their immigration authority to exploit their workforces, dissent can suggest
the opposite. It can mean that immigrants are acting in defiance of lawlessness.
C. The Harms of Self-Serving Screening Decisions
Employers are required to screen their workforces for unauthorized
immigrants, but they don’t carry out these duties in good faith, at least within
those industries traditionally dependent on low-wage labor. Part of the problem
is that employers face no real threat of being sanctioned. The number of fines
the INS and DHS have issued has been steadily declining. For example, in
1999, the number of notices of intent to fine totaled 417, but by 2001 it dropped
to 105, 52 and by 2004, dropped further still to a measly 3 employers. 53
How did this happen, and what are the consequences? In the following
sections, I outline what I see as the primary consequences of this arrangement.
Central to this story is the observation that the DHS has not only failed to
enforce IRCA against employers, it has worked with them in identifying
immigrants for removal. Moreover, the DHS has welcomed these “tips” and
“leads” without much consideration of the conditions triggering or the
51. I should be clear that I harbor some reservations about Congress’s attempts to
criminalize an increasing number of activities, but I do agree with Cox and Posner that, at
least as a descriptive matter, criminal convictions have served an ex post screening function.
52. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 393 n.25.
53. See Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Working and Citizenship, 55
UCLA L. REV. 1161, 1214 n.254 (2008) (citing GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: WEAKNESSES HINDER EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION AND
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 35 (2005)).
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consequences flowing from this assistance. As I show, the nonenforcement of
IRCA against employers—and thus the ceding of far-reaching screening
authority—has both legal and democratic costs.
1. Legal harms
Though I have yet to find an empirical study exploring employer reporting
and the conditions triggering reporting, the existing empirical—and growing
anecdotal—evidence all points to the same conclusion: within industries
traditionally dependent on immigrant labor, employers report the presence of
unauthorized workers as a way of escaping liability for labor- and employmentrelated workplace violations. To get a flavor of the nature of this abuse,
consider the following examples. At a Minneapolis hotel, a group of hotel
workers, citizens and noncitizens alike, had voted for union representation. But
just as negotiations were set to begin, the employer contacted the then-INS,
which staged a raid on the hotel and detained eight housekeepers. 54 Similarly,
in New York City, several unauthorized garment workers, primarily from Latin
America, Asia, and Eastern Europe, complained that the factory owner had
been withholding overtime pay, which prompted the owner to request a raid of
his own factory. Arresting nearly thirty workers, the INS declined to fine the
owner for his cooperation. 55 Elsewhere in New York, the owner of an online
grocery delivery service, who employed 900 workers, circulated a memo
announcing a pending workplace inspection, causing nearly 100 workers to
leave or never return. This highlights the reality that even just the threat of a
pending workplace inspection is enough to quell any organizing activity. 56
Although unauthorized immigrants are not entitled to backpay, 57 they still
possess a panoply of other labor and employment rights. 58 But despite the
existence of these rights, reporting and the threat of reporting effectively
neutralize the ability of unauthorized workers to make this protection
meaningful. The power that employers wield when they knowingly hire

54. Philip Martin & Mark Miller, Employer Sanctions: French, German and U.S.
Experiences 47 (Int’l Migration Papers, No. 36, 2000). This is an exceptional case where
many of the immigrant workers were granted relief by the immigration judge. See INS
Grants Deportation Relief to Minneapolis Immigrant Workers Fired for Union Activities,
RIGHTS
UPDATE,
June
6,
2000,
http://www.nilc.org/
IMMIGRANTS’
immsemplymnt/wkplce_enfrcmnt/wkplcenfrc012.htm.
55. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 389.
56. See Nina Bernstein, Groceries on the Computer, and Immigrants in the Cold, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2007, at B1; Nina Bernstein, Warehouse Workers Quit In Immigration
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at B6.
57. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148-49 (2002).
58. See Christine N. Cimini, Ask, Don’t Tell: Ethical Issues Surrounding
Undocumented Workers’ Status in Employment Litigation, 61 STAN. L. REV. 355, 357-58 n.8
(2008) (summarizing the various labor and employment claims available to unauthorized
workers).
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unauthorized immigrants has not been lost on the federal courts. Most notably,
in Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc. the Ninth Circuit observed that in addition to
retaliatory discharge, unauthorized workers face the “harsher reality that, in
addition to possible discharge, their employer will likely report them to the INS
and they will be subjected to deportation proceedings or criminal
prosecution.” 59 In affirming the district court’s denial of the employer’s
discovery requests pertaining to the plaintiffs’ immigration status, the Ninth
Circuit concluded, “Granting employers the right to inquire into workers’
immigration status in cases like this would allow them to raise implicitly the
threat of deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker,
documented or undocumented, reports illegal practices or files a Title VII
action.” 60 Other courts have addressed similar scenarios and reached similar
conclusions. 61
These decisions highlight the degree to which employers and the DHS
work collaboratively to detain and remove unauthorized immigrants despite
apparent violations by the employers themselves. In Montero v. INS, 62 an
unauthorized immigrant from Ecuador worked at a garment factory in New
York, where she assisted in the efforts to organize workers, and joined a union
in both an organizing and negotiating capacity. The employer threatened to
report certain unauthorized workers to the INS. As the dispute escalated, the
employer’s attorney contacted the INS, resulting in a workplace inspection, the
immigrant’s arrest, and ultimately deportation. 63 Thus, the question is not
whether employers in immigrant-dependent sectors knowingly hire
unauthorized immigrants—they do—but rather, under what circumstances
employers report their presence. Other anecdotal evidence confirms that
reporting is a prominent tool that employers use to quash organizing efforts.
Most recently, a DHS raid of a meatpacking plant in Iowa brought public
attention to the unsafe conditions under which many unauthorized immigrants

59. 364 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004).
60. Id. at 1065; see also Does I thru [sic] XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d
1058 (9th Cir. 2000). In Advanced Textile Corp., the Ninth Circuit addressed whether
plaintiffs could pursue labor violations anonymously, where plaintiffs were foreign workers
who faced the possibility of deportation. Siding with the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the threat of deportation rendered “extraordinary” the nature of retaliation in
this particular case. Id. at 1070-71.
61. For example, in Singh v. Jutla, an employer knowingly recruited and hired an
unauthorized worker and contacted the INS only when the immigrant attempted to recover
unpaid wages and overtime pay. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also
Fuentes v. INS, 765 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated by Fuentes v. INS, 884 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1988); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1055 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff, a secretary without work authorization,
could pursue FLSA where the employer reported the plaintiff to the INS in retaliation for her
filing of a claim seeking unpaid wages and overtime pay). But cf. Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d
381 (2d Cir. 1997).
62. 124 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1997).
63. Id. at 382-84.
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worked; several immigrants attested to lawlessness ranging from physical
beatings to the denial of overtime pay. One unauthorized worker caught up in
the raids explained that he often worked seventeen-hour days without breaks,
noting that “[the employers] told us they were going to call immigration if we
complained.” 64
The few empirical studies that have examined the experiences of
unauthorized immigrants in the workplace suggest a correlation between the
practice of employer reporting and anti-union animus. In a study examining
employers’ use of the threat of plant-closing to undermine unionizing efforts,
Kate Bronfenbrenner found that such threats often occurred within the context
of “other aggressive anti-union behavior by employers.” For example, nearly
75% of employers that threatened to report unauthorized immigrant workers to
the then-INS for removal also utilized plant-closing as a threat, compared to
only 46% of employers who had hired, but did not threaten to report,
unauthorized immigrants. 65 Significantly, Bronfenbrenner’s study also found
that the willingness of unauthorized workers to join unions or otherwise
organize with their citizen coworkers increased the likelihood that employers
would use the threat of reporting. While employers threatened to report
unauthorized workers to the INS as a response to organizing activities in 7% of
all unionizing campaigns, the rate jumps up to 52% when unauthorized
immigrants belonged to the bargaining unit. 66 In other words,
Bronfenbrenner’s study suggests that employers are reporting unauthorized
immigrants because of the tactic’s convenience as an exit strategy from
potentially ugly and expensive labor disputes.

64. Julia Preston, After Iowa Raid, Immigrants Fuel Labor Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 2008, at A1. Jennifer Gordon’s work also speaks to this phenomenon. In her book,
Suburban Sweatshops, which draws heavily from her experience organizing low-wage
immigrant workers, Gordon details the “minimalist approach” that employers take to
complying with IRCA’s verification duties. She observes:
If a worker presents documents that appear reasonably legitimate when she is hired, the
employer records them on the I-9 form designed for the purpose, drops the form in a file, and
thinks no more about it—until the day comes when such workers make some demand the
employer wants to resist. It may be a simple request for a bathroom break or for overtime
wages. More often, it comes as the first stirrings of a union organizing campaign. Suddenly,
the employer remembers employer sanctions. If he had never filled out I-9 forms, he gets the
urge to comply with the law, forcing all the workers to provide legal papers on the spot. If he
has I-9 files, he begins to pay new attention to them, calling the Social Security
Administration to check on the validity of numbers, demanding to see new versions of
documents that have expired.

JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 49-50
(2005). Gordon further notes that “[e]mployer sanctions has [sic] become the perfect cloak
under which to carry out an effective campaign of intimidation, sending the clear message
that immigrant workers who organize are no longer the kind of immigrant workers who get
jobs.” Id. at 50.
65. KATE BRONFENBRENNER, UNEASY TERRAIN: THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL MOBILITY ON
WORKERS, WAGES, AND UNION ORGANIZING 46-47 (2000), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=reports.
66. Id. at 44.
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Another study published by the Center for Urban Economic Development
confirms the dangers that unauthorized immigrant workers face in the
workplace. The results of a survey conducted with 1131 authorized and
unauthorized immigrants in Chicago suggest that unauthorized workers
experience unsafe working conditions more often than do authorized
immigrants. 67 Despite the high incidence of unsafe working conditions, 94% of
those unauthorized immigrants indicated that they did not report the unsafe
working conditions to OSHA. Significantly, 62% of those workers indicated
that their reason for not reporting related to either the fear of employer
retaliation or to the fear of deportation. 68 The same study found that
unauthorized immigrants, compared to their authorized counterparts, were more
likely to experience wage and hour violations; 26% of undocumented workers
alleged that they experienced nonpayment or underpayment of wages compared
to only 9% of documented workers. 69
Finally, Michael Wishnie provides an illuminating statistical profile of
worksite enforcement in New York City, one of DHS’s largest and busiest
districts. By filing Freedom of Information Act and Freedom of Information
Law requests, Wishnie obtained DHS worksite-enforcement data for a thirtymonth period in the New York region revealing the deep entanglement between
INS worksite enforcement and the presence of formal labor disputes. The data
revealed that more than half of the raided worksites were subject to at least one
formal complaint to, or investigation by, a labor agency. 70 Wishnie plausibly
argues that the actual correlation between worksite enforcement and labor
disputes is probably greater when one considers those workplaces that have
been involved in less formal disputes such as union grievances, ongoing
litigation, informal complaints, and complaints to related agencies, such as
those addressing employment discrimination and workplace safety. 71

67. CHIRAG MEHTA ET AL., CTR. FOR URBAN ECON. DEV., UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI.,
CHICAGO’S UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: AN ANALYSIS OF WAGES, WORKING CONDITIONS,
AND ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 27 (2002), available at http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/uicued/
Publications/RECENT/undoc_full.pdf.
68. Specifically, the report found that of the reasons identified, “32% relate to the fear
that employers would punish workers for reporting the conditions” and “30% relate
specifically to the fear that workers might be deported if they report the conditions.” Id. at
28.
69. Id. at 29. The survey found that the disparities continued into other wage and hour
allegations as well: 21% of undocumented workers alleged forced overtime compared to
16% of documented workers, and 18% of undocumented workers alleged working without
breaks compared to 7% of documented workers. Id.
70. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 391-92.
71. Id. at 392.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1272238

S LEE 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103

1124

4/25/2009 1:46 PM

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1103

2. Democratic harms
Permitting employers to screen for unauthorized immigrants has also
generated democratic costs in the workplace. To appreciate these costs, I begin
with the observation that the workplace provides more than just the opportunity
to earn a paycheck. As Cynthia Estlund has capably shown, the workplace and
jobs matter not only for the material resources they enable, “but also for the
positive social ties, norms of reciprocity, and feelings of trust, mutual
responsibility, and solidarity that they engender.” 72 The workplace brings
people together and creates opportunities to develop a sense of collective
identity.
For adult immigrants, the opportunities to develop a sense of collective
identity that cuts across the lines of citizenship and immigration status remain
sparse. Indeed, the workplace persists as one of the few areas of public life
where adult unauthorized immigrants have the opportunity to meet and form
bonds with citizens. As Cristina Rodríguez reminds us, “For immigrant
children and the second generation, adaptation occurs in the public schools, but
adult immigrants simply do not have access to such an assimilating
institution.” 73 Therefore, permitting employers who knowingly hire
unauthorized immigrants to set the terms of the workplace does more than just
increase the likelihood of exploitation; it also decreases the possibility that
adult immigrant workers will seek out or foster meaningful relationships with
their citizen co-workers. This in turn discourages unauthorized immigrants
from embracing a sense of identity as Americans or North Carolinians or
workers or any other collective identity transcending citizenship and
immigration status.
The associative obligations being undermined by employers embody more
than just the wistful aspiration to build a sense of worker solidarity. This
tangible sense of community often represents a persistent willingness and
desire to transcend racial differences in the workplace, which if cultivated can
generate the sort of social peace that our immigration policy must commit to
achieving. For example, while more empirical research is required, initial
sociological studies suggest that racial animus and resentment in the workplace
exist at a relatively low level when compared to other social institutions
occupying the same geographic space. 74 Permitting employers to report
72. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 117 (2003).
73. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What
Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 237; see also
JANELLE S. WONG, DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE: IMMIGRANTS & AMERICAN CIVIC INSTITUTIONS
173 (2006) (“Community organizations, such as labor organizations, workers’ centers,
advocacy and social service organizations, ethnic voluntary associations, and religious
institutions, may be more likely than parties to invest in long-term mobilization of
immigrants.”).
74. Gordon and Lenhardt note that according to a study conducted by sociologist
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unauthorized workers who organize with their citizen coworkers, therefore,
suggests that those immigrants who are screened out are among the more
racially literate. 75 Most unskilled immigrant workers are Latino, and they are
coming to occupy jobs traditionally held by African Americans. In the process,
they are being mapped onto a racial terrain, 76 and confronting conflict in the
workplace. 77
Certainly, the unauthorized status of many of these new Latino immigrants
complicates our notions of a democratic community and its obligations. For
some, it may seem strange to insist on facilitating the integration of those who
have yet to be recognized as members of our national community. Yet, it would
be equally strange to think that someday millions of these immigrant workers
may become citizens and may be able to do so only after shunning the company
of, and the attempts to organize by, their citizen coworkers. And it would be
outright troubling to think that those unauthorized immigrants who never
became citizens—because they were detected, screened out, and removed—
missed out because they attempted to assert their rights and demonstrate a sense
of investment in the workplace.
Thus, our current de facto system of screening the workplace for
unauthorized immigrants reveals that there are times when we should not
reward those who lay low. If immigrants are coming to the United States for
job opportunities, and Congress has empowered employers to act as
immigration screeners, then the case of private immigration screening in the
workplace forces us to rethink the kind of immigrant behavior we ought to
reward.

Helen Marrow on relationships between black and immigrant workers in a large chickenprocessing plant, “tensions in the poultry plant paled in comparison to those evident in the
community at large. . . . Indeed, participants in Marrow’s study consistently ‘report[ed]
positive relations among workers of different racial and ethnic backgrounds as well as a lack
of racial discrimination.’” JENNIFER GORDON & R.A. LENHARDT, CONFLICT AND SOLIDARITY
BETWEEN AFRICAN AMERICAN AND LATINO IMMIGRANT WORKERS 25 (2007) (alterations in
original). For an excellent analysis of the difficulties of finding legal recourse for
demonstrations of intergroup racial solidarity in the workplace, see Noah D. Zatz, Beyond
the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63
(2002).
75. See Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92 (2004).
76. See Devon W. Carbado, Racial Naturalization, 57 AM. Q. 633 (2005).
77. Gordon and Lenhardt explain that the tension between black citizens and Latino
immigrants in the workplace derives in part from the different paths each group has taken to
the workplace, which has produced different perspectives on the meaning of work. While
both groups recognize that they are victimized by the same degrading and humiliating acts in
the workplace, differing expectations impede the development of a true sense of solidarity.
While Latino immigrant workers might be able to tolerate subpar conditions in exchange for
the opportunity to earn wages that exceed many times over what they could make in their
sending country, black citizen workers can barely tolerate still more proof that they have not
yet achieved the fruits of full citizenship. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 53, at 1202-19.
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II. ENFORCEMENT REALITIES, RATIONALES, AND COLLABORATIONS
IRCA required employers to hire only “authorized” workers, but today
employers face almost no possibility of being punished for failing to carry out
these duties. In the Subparts that follow, I explore the origins of this
phenomenon and explain how and why it has persisted.
A. Underenforcement as Enforcement Policy
IRCA’s design and history suggests that Congress intended to deter
unauthorized immigration by targeting employers. IRCA’s implementation
history, however, demonstrates that from the very beginning the then-INS
demonstrated a willingness to work with employers, rather than fully
committing to a policy of targeting and punishing them. 78
Legal scholarship confirms that employers, at least within traditionally
immigrant-dependent industries, have continued to knowingly hire
unauthorized immigrant workers. Kitty Calavita’s 1990 study remains an
important and relevant explanation of this phenomenon. Conducting interviews
with hiring managers at over one hundred southern California firms
concentrated in sectors traditionally dependent on immigrant labor, 79
Calavita’s study establishes that nearly half of those managers suspected that
they had hired unauthorized workers, and more than ten percent admitted
outright that they had knowingly hired such workers. 80 Several insisted that
they would continue to hire unauthorized workers despite IRCA’s prohibition,
which suggests that a combination of competitive pressure and the then-INS’s

78. Some have hinted at this culture of collaboration. For example, nearly twenty years
ago, Kitty Calavita noted that early implementation efforts swam in a “spirit of
cooperation . . . devoted to establishing rapport with employers and encouraging voluntary
compliance with employer sanctions.” Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations:
Toward a Dialectical Model of White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1061
(1990). From a similar vantage point, Linda Bosniak observed that “[IRCA] creates a
structured antagonism of interests between employers and the INS. Under the previous
regime, . . . employers often cooperated with the INS during the agency’s workplace surveys
because cooperation frequently meant less disruption of production and because they did not
face any penalties for hiring undocumented workers.” Linda S. Bosniak, supra note 4, at
1035. Bosniak could not have predicted the degree to which government-employer
cooperation would continue even in a post-IRCA world, though she did with great acumen
identify those dynamics that would enable such cooperation. See id. at 1035-36 (noting that
the relatively toothless wording of IRCA introduced “elements of direct conflict between
employers and undocumented workers” and opining that it “will always be in the interest of
an employer, when faced with the charge of knowingly hiring an undocumented alien, to
deny awareness of the worker’s unauthorized status”).
79. Calavita identifies these industries as including the garment, construction,
electronics, hotel, restaurant, food processing, and building and landscape maintenance
industries. She excluded the agriculture industry because it was not subject to sanctions
during the period of study, which was 1987-88. Calavita, supra note 78, at 1046-47.
80. Id. at 1050-51.
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perceived impotence encouraged employers to disregard these duties. 81
Contrary to IRCA’s design, employers in these industries have either ignored or
willfully blinded themselves to the immigration status of their workers,
screening in unauthorized immigrants. Thus, although IRCA’s design and logic
set out to narrow employer hiring decisions, agency enforcement policies have,
paradoxically, enabled and broadened them.
Many features of the then-INS’s enforcement policy were designed to send
the message that employers would not be sanctioned as a part of its regulatory
strategy. For example, as soon as IRCA was passed, the INS embraced a
recruitment and hiring strategy that could best achieve a cordial, professional
relationship with employers. It replaced law-and-order border enforcement
officers, who historically had conducted confrontational and aggressive
workplace raids, with high-achieving college graduates who offered a skill set
geared towards conciliatory regulation. As one INS official remarked,
“Sanctions demands [sic] in some way a new level of professionalism or
sophistication. You must be better trained and more sensitive.” 82 Indeed, INS
guidelines instituted in the wake of IRCA’s passage “stressed cooperation with
business” and sought to avoid the possibility of “harassment and heavy-handed
enforcement.” 83 This shift in attitude did not go unnoticed by employers. As
one restaurant industry representative observed, “Prior to [IRCA], the INS
would come in and be belligerent. They are coming in today in a much more
conciliatory way.” 84 Over time, the INS has come to be concerned only with
the most egregious accounts of hiring unauthorized workers—those where a
raid stands to make a big political splash—so that the vast majority of
employers are free to hire unauthorized workers without fear of sanction. 85

81. According to Calavita’s study, well over half of the employers believed that other
employers in similar industries hired unauthorized immigrants, while over thirty percent
were “convinced” that the INS did not have the ability to enforce sanctions. Id. at 1053.
82. Jason Juffras, IRCA and the Enforcement Mission of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, in THE PAPER CURTAIN: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS’ IMPLEMENTATION,
IMPACT, AND REFORM 33, 40 (Michael Fix ed., 1991).
83. Id. at 41. As one scholar noted:
In the long run, the new recruitment policy for the Investigations Division may have a
stronger impact on the agency when this large cohort of special agents begins to assume
leadership posts. In the past, management positions in the INS have been dominated by
former Border Patrol officers committed to an enforcement policy of raids and
apprehensions. The recruitment of agents from different backgrounds, trained to regulate
businesses instead of apprehend immigrants may erode that pattern and broaden the
perspectives of agency managers.

Id. at 40-41.
84. Id. at 42 (internal quotations omitted).
85. As early as 1981, certain enforcement officials who supported employer sanctions
attempted to assuage employer concerns by emphasizing the conciliatory nature of the new
law. For example, Doris Meissner, then the acting Commissioner of the INS, stated that
“implementation of the law is not designed to be and will not be antiemployer.” Calavita,
supra note 78, at 1058 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
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The possibility of employers being sanctioned became even more remote
when Congress began expanding the grounds for removal on the basis of
criminal convictions. As a result, the INS reallocated its resources to pursuing
criminal noncitizens at the expense of targeting incompliant employers, and
accordingly the number of workplace inspections dropped precipitously during
the 1990s. 86 To be fair, at least some immigration officers, particularly at the
more junior levels, expressed frustration with the statute itself during the early
years of IRCA’s implementation. They complained of the difficulty of proving
that an employer had “knowingly” hired unauthorized workers. 87 Moreover,
over time, some employers obtained congressional protection against sanctions,
which could only have encouraged the INS as an agency to redirect its
enforcement efforts away from employers and towards immigrants. But even if
the INS’s hands were tied in part because of the statute’s narrower provisions,
and even if the political power of some employers erected barriers to the fullfledged enforcement of sanctions, these factors alone cannot explain the extent
to which INS and now DHS officials have continued to remain allied with
employers against immigrants.
Puzzling enforcement policy decisions suggest that at least some of the
prosecutorial impotence has been self-imposed. For example, consider the
procedures for initiating contact with employers who are the targets of an
investigation. Once the DHS decides to investigate a particular employer, it
provides the employer with three-days notice that it plans to dispatch officers to
question workers and audit the employer’s records. 88 But if the DHS were
serious about targeting employers for immigration law violations it might
consider pursuing enforcement policies embraced by the Department of Labor
(DOL), another agency charged with the responsibility of regulating the
workplace. When the DOL investigates an employer for labor law violations,
for example, it executes an unannounced visit, rather than providing employers
with notice, which only provides an opportunity for employers to hide their
tracks. 89
86. MARTIN & MILLER, supra note 54, at 2 (“Since removing criminal aliens wins the
INS praise, while sanctions enforcement brings attacks from employers, worker groups, and
politicians, removing criminal aliens has become the INS’s highest priority.”). While the
INS investigated 15,000 employers in 1989, by 1995, the number had dropped to just 6000.
On a related note, in 2004, the Immigration Control and Enforcement Bureau issued a total
of three Notices of Intent to Fine, down from 417 just five years earlier. Gordon & Lenhardt,
supra note 53, at 1214 n.254 (citing GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT: WEAKNESSES HINDER EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION AND WORKSITE
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 35 (2005)).
87. See Elizabeth Rolph & Abby Robyn, Los Angeles: A Window on Employer
Sanctions, in THE PAPER CURTAIN: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS’ IMPLEMENTATION, IMPACT, AND
REFORM, supra note 82, at 97, 116.
88. The three-days-notice requirement was a part of the INS’s larger plan to “signal[] a
cooperative attitude toward employers in designing investigative procedures.” Juffras, supra
note 82, at 42.
89. See MARTIN & MILLER, supra note 54, at 32 (noting that DOL inspectors do not
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Recent workplace enforcement activity by the DHS demonstrates a
renewed interest in the workplace as a site for detaining unauthorized
immigrants. Indeed, the number of unauthorized immigrants detained in the
workplace has been steadily rising, 90 which suggests that the DHS has
reprioritized enforcing immigration laws in the workplace. 91 Recent highprofile workplace raids, like those that occurred at various meatpacking plants
belonging to the Swift meatpacking company, appear to bolster this idea. 92 But
this reprioritization of the workplace as an enforcement objective has not
punished employers—at least not as contemplated under IRCA. 93
B. Rationalizing a Necessary Evil
If employers possess serious incentives to hire unauthorized workers, why
empower them to screen out the very workers they hope to hire? Why place the
power to make decisions with serious immigration-related consequences in the
hands of a decision maker with incentives to cheat? One pragmatic reason is to
exploit the unique position that employers occupy in relation to unauthorized
immigrants. Employers are, relative to immigration officials, in a better
position to identify unauthorized immigrants. 94 If the putative reason that
immigrants enter the United States is to search for work, under this logic at
least some immigration enforcement authority ought to be transferred to
employers because they will inevitably encounter unauthorized immigrants. In
provide employers with notice when making inspections). An employer announcing a
pending audit is usually enough to compel unauthorized workers to quit or stop coming to
work. See Bernstein, Groceries, supra note 56, at B1; Bernstein, Warehouse Workers, supra
note 56, at B6.
90. Motomura, supra note 37, at 2052. In 2003, the DHS made only 445
“administrative arrests,” but by 2007, that figure had risen to over 4000. U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, Worksite Enforcement (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.ice.gov/pi/
news/factsheets/worksite.htm.
91. It remains to be seen whether the Obama administration will continue this trend.
92. In 2006, the DHS raided several meatpacking plants belonging to Swift &
Company, detaining hundreds of unauthorized workers and culminating a ten-month
investigation. See Aldana, supra note 13, at 1092-96.
93. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 90 (“The presence of
illegal aliens at a business does not necessarily mean the employer is responsible.
Developing sufficient evidence against employers requires complex, white-collar crime
investigations that can take years to bear fruit.”). While the presence of unauthorized
workers at a particular worksite does not mean that the employer can be held liable under
IRCA, as has been long recognized by scholars, many employers can comport with IRCA’s
prohibition against hiring unauthorized workers as a matter of law while still knowingly
hiring unauthorized workers as a matter of fact. See Calavita, supra note 78, at 1060
(“Through [IRCA’s] affirmative defense and good faith provisions, Congress guaranteed that
conformity with the paperwork requirements would be taken as an indication of compliance,
thereby ensuring that violations of the ‘knowing hire’ provision—the real meat of the law—
would be virtually risk-free.”).
94. Some have characterized employers as “gatekeepers” in the larger system of
unauthorized immigration. See Manns, supra note 4, at 893-94.
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other words, employer screening is a necessary evil lodged in an immigration
regime saddled with tradeoffs.
A regulatory strategy grounded in a worldview of necessary evils
recognizes the difficulty of regulating employer hiring decisions. In this
respect, IRCA mirrors other third-party regulatory schemes, where the
government compels a well-positioned private entity to withhold a legitimate
good or service which is necessary for others to engage in illegitimate
activities. The duties that IRCA requires employers to carry out occupy the
same universe as those required of other uniquely situated private parties:
airlines must verify that their passengers possess valid documentation for entry
into the United States, 95 banks must keep records and report suspicious activity
indicative of money laundering, 96 employers must withhold taxes from their
employees, 97 and firearms dealers must run background checks on buyers. 98
Our nation’s anti-money-laundering 99 regime is particularly instructive. In
seeking to disrupt criminal finance channels, the Treasury Department relies on
banks, which possess a positional advantage in terms of the sorts of information
they can access. 100 In the face of the robust growth banks have undergone,
money laundering laws reject the notion that banks occupy a purely neutral
position within the larger enterprise of drug and terrorism finance. 101 Even the
95. See 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2006).
96. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight
Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 311, 324 (2002).
97. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in
Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 698 (2007) (describing how tax law is structured so
that employers must withhold taxes from their employees, and remit those taxes to the
government, which suggests that “[s]tructural systems that engage third parties to help
facilitate compliance with the federal income tax are thus highly successful”).
98. Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006).
99. Ronald Noble and Court Golumbic explain:
“Money laundering” as a criminal term first arose in the United States, in reference to the
Mafia’s process of commingling illicit income, “dirty money,” with cash receipts of
legitimate businesses in order to make the dirty money also appear legitimate, or “clean.” . . .
Today, “money laundering” is used to describe the role Swiss banks played in providing
secret accounts to protect the assets of Nazis during World War II. The term is also used to
refer to the process of funneling foreign funds into the coffers of U.S. presidential candidates
in alleged violations of U.S. laws. Whatever the context, money laundering involves
disguising the source or use of illicitly derived money to make its subsequent use appear
legitimate.

Ronald K. Noble & Court E. Golumbic, A New Anti-Crime Framework for the World:
Merging the Objective and Subjective Models for Fighting Money Laundering, 30 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 79, 79-80 (1997).
100. See id. at 92 (“Tainted funds must pass through banks and financial institutions at
some point before the link between the funds and their criminal origin has become
sufficiently attenuated.”).
101. Congress set out to rein in “the emerging class of professional money launderers
comprising bankers, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals who [were] willing to
look the other way for a price.” KRIS HINTERSEER, CRIMINAL FINANCE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF MONEY LAUNDERING IN A COMPARATIVE LEGAL CONTEXT 193 (2002). As
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Supreme Court has rejected the notion that banks are merely “bystanders” or
“neutrals” in the fight against criminal finance. 102 Mapping a similar logic,
IRCA sought to regulate employer hiring practices under the belief that
preventing employers from making work a viable option for immigrants would
deter unauthorized immigration.
Some scholars point out that it is employers’ unique position that makes
them so difficult to regulate. Jeffrey Manns, for example, characterizes
employers as “gatekeepers” who are compelled “to fill enforcement gaps”
because of the ideal position that they occupy. Employers are in good position,
relative to public enforcement officers, to identify unauthorized workers. 103 A
third-party liability system like IRCA promises much needed and cost-effective
support in deterring unauthorized immigration because employers can gain
access to information (i.e., a worker’s immigration status) which is largely
inaccessible to public officials. 104 But the same attributes that contribute to an
employer’s appeal as a gatekeeper make public oversight challenging: an
employer’s position permits her to shirk her duties without any real possibility
of detection. 105

Hinterseer observes, globalization, technological innovation, and deregulation have created a
banking culture that has become more “dynamic and aggressive,” which has meant “for
regulators one of the fundamental challenges concerns how to create the appropriate
incentives to ensure financial institutions adopt a compliance culture.” Id. at 338.
While Congress began targeting money laundering as early as 1970, it really stepped up
its efforts in 1986 by passing the Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA), which for the
first time truly incentivized banks and other financial institutions to aid the federal effort in
fighting money laundering. Pre-MLCA, the public revelation that a financial institution had
some association with a money laundering scheme meant that it had to contend only with
negative media attention and diminished reputation. But post-MLCA, Congress ensured that
these same institutions would incur serious, concrete costs, including a fine, which was
either $500,000 or twice the sum of the laundered money (whichever amount was greater),
or up to twenty years of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) (2006).
102. In upholding the constitutionality of these reporting and recordkeeping duties, the
Supreme Court has noted:
Congress not illogically decided that if records of transactions of negotiable instruments were
to be kept and maintained, in order to be available as evidence under customary legal process
if the occasion warranted, the bank was the most easily identifiable party to the instrument
and therefore should do the recordkeeping.

Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 49 (1974). The Court in Shultz went out of its
way to disabuse the bank Petitioners of the notion that they were “complete bystanders” or
“conscripted neutrals” but rather concluded that they were “parties to the instruments with a
substantial stake in their continued availability and acceptance.” Id. at 48-49.
103. Manns, supra note 4, at 893, 895-98.
104. Id. at 898 (“Because of their commercial or professional relationships,
gatekeepers may enjoy privileged access to information about prospective wrongdoing or
skills that may allow them to process and recognize potential illegal acts in cost-effective
ways.”).
105. Manns posits that monitoring duties could be shared with private entities, like
unauthorized immigrants themselves or other firms, who could be incentivized to report
employers that fail to carry out their verification duties. See id. at 945-60.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1272238

S LEE 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103

1132

4/25/2009 1:46 PM

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1103

Beyond pragmatic considerations, an unmistakable aspect of IRCA’s
regulatory logic is grounded in a sense of moral responsibility. In the pre-IRCA
era, as state and local communities like California grappled with the reality of
unauthorized immigration, courts expressed great consternation over the
callous and unregulated activities of employers. For example, several cases
worked their way through the California court system during the early 1970s.
These cases were brought by lawful workers against employers for hiring
unauthorized immigrants. As one impassioned California court observed:
Despite decades of protest and officially expressed concern, there has been no
solution to the dilemma posed by agriculture’s heavy, short-term need for
manpower and society’s inability to absorb that manpower when agriculture’s
need is past. From Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath to the present, the thin gruel
of public welfare handouts has been farm labor’s principal progress to the
remote goal of social justice. 106

Though more measured in its tone, the Supreme Court reflected a similar
sentiment in De Canas v. Bica. The Court understood employer sanctions to be
just one part of a larger worker-oriented regime, which regulated child labor,
minimum wages, occupational health and safety, and workers’ compensation.
In the Court’s eyes, the hiring of unauthorized immigrants no less threatened
the livelihood of workers by “seriously depress[ing] wage scales and working
conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens.” 107 In this way, IRCA
resembles other workplace regulations. 108

106. Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 448-49 (Ct. App. 1970). What is so
interesting about Diaz is the lengths the court went to lay out the sort of legal sea change it
envisioned as necessary to fight unauthorized immigration. It effectively sketched out the
blueprints for our modern employer sanctions regime. The court was as specific about
employer duties as it was casual about diminishing the constitutional rights of workers.
Putting to one side “possible restrictions on inquiry emanating from civil rights legislation,”
id. at 599 n.12, the court would have employers conduct a “simple interrogation” at the
workplace, which would require them to obtain and examine social security cards, along
with birth certificates, vehicle operating licenses, and alien registration cards. Id. at 449-50.
Like immigration officers, employers would be required “to determine the status, legal or
illegal, of each new worker[,]” and would do so under the threat of punishment “by fine or
jail.” Id. at 450. In what can only be read as a judicial mandate to the legislature, the court
suggests that “[m]ultiple injunctions covering a wide segment of California agriculture
would have the cumulative effect of a statutory regulation, administered by the superior
courts through the medium of contempt hearings.” Id.
107. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976). It is well known as a historical
matter that employers have favored unauthorized immigrant workers. As Aristide Zolberg
observes, much of U.S. immigration policy has been informed by the clash between
“capitalists eager to maximize their labor supply against defenders of the traditional
boundaries of American society, whom historians subsequently labeled ‘nativists,’ and urban
wage workers, who perceived immigrants as a threat to their living and an obstacle to the
organization of a labor movement.” ZOLBERG, supra note 25, at 5.
108. See Robert Bach & Doris Meissner, Employment and Immigration Reform:
Employer Sanctions Four Years Later, in THE PAPER CURTAIN, supra note 82, at 285 (“IRCA
reinforced the idea that labor market protections and immigration regulations are closely
intertwined. Employers who hire illegal aliens benefit just as do those who offer
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The early discourse suggested a concern with a culture of lawlessness
surrounding employer hiring decisions. Consider the findings and
recommendations of the Select Committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy
(SCIRP Report), submitted to Congress in 1981, which identifies employers as
encouraging the “illegal flow” of unauthorized immigration. 109 After observing
that unauthorized immigrants work and live “at the mercy of unscrupulous
employers,” the Report goes on to explain that what is “[m]ost serious is the
fact that illegality breeds illegality.” 110 The SCIRP Report describes a culture
of lawlessness, which is negotiated and reproduced within the hiring context,
and then, like a contagion, migrates into other contexts:
The presence of a substantial number of undocumented/illegal aliens in the
United States has resulted not only in a disregard for immigration law but in
the breaking of minimum wage and occupational safety laws, and statutes
against smuggling as well. As long as undocumented migration flouts U.S.
immigration law, its most devastating impact may be the disregard it breeds
for other U.S. laws. 111

Perhaps most interestingly, despite the public indifference towards
unauthorized immigrants that emerges periodically, IRCA’s passage also
exhibited a palpable concern for the welfare of the unauthorized immigrants
themselves. The SCIRP Report recognized the human costs of engaging in an
interior enforcement strategy were not insubstantial, noting, “It is both more
humane and cost effective to deter people from entering the United States than
it is to locate and remove them from the interior.” 112 Moreover, the difficulty
of distinguishing authorized from unauthorized workers has long been
recognized (sometimes quite crudely) by courts as a problem for any effective
interior immigration enforcement regime, 113 and has troubled scholars (often
quite rightly) for the collateral damage that overzealous enforcement tends to
generate.

subminimum wages and poor working conditions. IRCA addressed the same issues of
responsibility, burden sharing, competitiveness, and productivity that are inherent in any
workplace-oriented legislation.”).
109. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 41
(1981) [hereinafter SCIRP REPORT]. As others have pointed out, the SCIRP Report
constituted the most significant study of the period leading up to IRCA’s passage. See
Wishnie, supra note 4, at 194 n.4.
110. SCIRP REPORT, supra note 109, at 41.
111. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 47.
113. See, e.g., Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 446-47 (Ct. App. 1970)
(characterizing the “illegal entrant” or “wetback” as a “considerable force in the farm labor
market” because “illegal entrants are able to blend into the local labor force”).
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C. Collaborations
Given the competitive market within which employers operate, the only
costs they face for immigration law violations are those associated with rerecruiting, rehiring, and retraining new workers. Not only do these costs as a
whole not outweigh the benefits of hiring workers who are willing to work
“scared and hard,” 114 that employers—the putative regulatory targets of
workplace raids—lodge objections within a vocabulary of replacement costs
demonstrates the degree to which sanctions have disappeared as palpable
threats. 115 Even where border enforcement officers conduct workplace raids—
which certainly force employers to incur unwanted costs—many of these are
conducted as “cooperative venture[s].” 116 Testifying before Congress, John
Shandley, the Senior Vice President of Human Resources for Swift &
Company, implored Congress to help find “a collaborative way of
apprehending all potential illegal workers and criminals in order to minimize
disruption to the company, the communities and the livestock producers.” 117
But Shandley’s call for a “collaborative way” offers as much descriptive
substance as it does rhetorical flourish.
This collaboration, or partnership, which has emerged between our nation’s
employers and the DHS highlights the ways in which immigration
responsibilities have become privatized in some important ways.
Administrative law and other public law scholars have long grappled with the
consequences of, and tested out the assumptions embedded within, the
allocation of power between public and private entities. The questions hanging
over this body of work concern decision-making authority and its limitations,

114. Motomura, supra note 37, at 2069 (quoting F. Ray Marshall, Economic Factors
Influencing the International Migration of Workers, in VIEWS ACROSS THE BORDER 163, 169
(Stanley R. Ross ed., 1978)).
115. One of the primary concerns that the SCIRP Report focused on was the reality
that employers could hire unauthorized immigrants and fear nothing more than the
possibility of having to incur the cost of replacing removed unauthorized immigrant workers.
As the SCIRP Report notes, “Even if an employer is found to be employing undocumented
workers, the penalty is merely the cost of finding and training replacements. Furthermore,
the employer is free to hire still more undocumented/illegal aliens without incurring any
additional penalties.” SCIRP REPORT, supra note 109, at 61.
116. Nessel, supra note 4, at 359.
117. Problems in the Current Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement
System, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. &
Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 40 (2007) (statement of John
Shandley, Senior Vice President of Human Resources, Swift & Company) (emphasis added),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/34925.pdf. Some have
suggested that workplace enforcement in the form of sanctions and raids constitutes, at best,
exercises of State power designed to achieve symbolic rather than actual enforcement goals.
See Calavita, supra note 78, at 1060 (“Facing a contradiction between political and
economic forces, legislators produced a law whose effect was to be solely symbolic.”);
Pham, supra note 4, at 817 (“Measured over time, the real impact of employer sanctions may
be a symbolic one.”).
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and go to whether private entities should wield such authority, and if so under
what conditions. Centering on those aspects of our culture and society that
value collective decision making, these scholars often conclude that shifting
towards a model of governance through private decision making unsettles
democratic norms. 118
Private decision making is a modern reality. Even a superficial
examination of what we commonly believe to be paradigmatically “public”
institutions reveals the degree to which public and private actors engage and are
engaged by one another across a continuum of relationships. 119 Often, the State
contracts out the provision of public services to private actors, 120 where the
State acts as a consumer weighing different service-delivery options offered by
competing private entities. 121 Examples of this sort of privatization scheme
range from those that are fairly innocuous such as refuse collection 122 to those
implicating more serious outcomes such as dispute resolution, 123 prison
management, 124 military campaigns, 125 and overseas humanitarian aid
delivery. 126
118. In a recent symposium examining privatization, Mark Moore observed that one of
the challenges wrought by privatization involves the shifting of “the arbiter of value from a
political process focused on defining collective ambitions and aspirations to an individual
deciding whether something is good in his or her own (more or less selfish, hedonistic, and
materialistic) terms.” Mark H. Moore, Introduction: Public Laws in an Era of Privatization,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1215 (2003).
119. As Martha Minow observes, the privatization phenomenon involves not one type,
but rather a “continuum of relationships between government and private groups,” where the
State encourages, exempts, funds, partners, and charters the private sector in order to serve
the public’s various needs. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for
the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1255 (2003).
120. The privatization literature’s center is occupied by discussions about
governmental entities contracting out services to private actors, who are charged with the
responsibility of delivering those services for the public’s benefit. See Jody Freeman,
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1286-89
(2003) (explaining that privatization in the American context often means contracting out
public services to private entities).
121. The conceptualization of the state as a consumer also signifies a shift in our
culture of governance where public actors evince a newfound faith in market-style
competition as a way ensuring sound governance. See Minow, supra note 119, at 1230. That
the state is increasingly turning to for-profit rather than nonprofit private entities
demonstrates the extent to which market-style privatization has taken hold, even though
strictly speaking, for-profit and nonprofit entities fall on the same side of the public/private
divide. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
552 (2000).
122. Id. at 597.
123. Minow, supra note 119, at 1238-40.
124. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437
(2005). But see Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political
Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197 (2008).
125. P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY
INDUSTRY (2003).
126. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and
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Other public-private collaborations proceed in a looser fashion, where the
State retains no formal relationship with the private entity. One well-recognized
example is the private police, where private security companies provide a wide
range of “law and order” services traditionally performed by the public police,
including the patrolling of neighborhoods with the purpose of “safeguarding
private property against theft, trespass, or damage.” 127 Although formal
agreements may exist, they often only bind the private companies to the
consumers of these services, and not to the public police, which might
otherwise impose public norms to which these private companies must
comport. Other informal collaborations include those that have emerged in the
war on terror. In what Jon Michaels dubs “handshake agreements,” phone
companies and parcel delivery services have discreetly shared customer
information with the executive. 128 Although these private companies are well
situated to provide potentially helpful information in the fight against terrorism,
Michaels observes that the absence of formal agreements and meaningful
oversight “leaves Congress and the courts ill-equipped to weigh in on important
policy considerations regarding the proper scope and calibration of
counterterrorism and homeland security operations, not to mention ill-equipped
to intervene to remedy individual instances or patterns of injustice.” 129 These
sorts of opaque partnerships enable waste, corruption, and unjustified
impositions of force, and provide the victims of such harm little recourse.
Beyond the curious exigencies of the war on terror, other informal
collaborations have persisted in more familiar areas of public regulation. The
criminal justice system’s reliance on informants, for example, represents a
particularly costly public-private collaboration. Exploring the community and
institutional consequences of informants or “snitches,” Alexandra Natapoff has
persuasively shown that:
Active informants impose their criminality on their community, while at the
same time compromising the privacy and peace of mind of families, friends,
and neighbors. . . . In this scheme, the individual willing to sacrifice friends,
family, and associates, fares better than the loyalist; the criminal snitch is
permitted to continue violating the law even as those on whom he snitches are
punished. 130

It is within this type of collaboration that our nation’s employers and the
DHS belong. Had IRCA been carried out in a manner consistent with its
the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 154
(2005).
127. Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573,
611; Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49,
51-52 (2004).
128. Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence
Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REV. 901, 904 (2008).
129. Id.
130. Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences,
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 649-50 (2004) (citations omitted).
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structure and logic, we might tell a different privatization story. IRCA formally
transferred to employers screening authority which was to be used to carry out
a specific mandate: verify immigration status to exclude unauthorized workers
from the workplace. But the collaboration that has emerged forces us to tell a
story where employers use their screening authority to carry out their own
agendas. And no DHS policy or practice signals to employers that they might
be held to account for their decisions.
No mechanism—no statute, regulation, or contract—requires or even
encourages employers to report the presence of unauthorized workers to the
DHS. Rather, such a practice is purely the creation of a regulatory regime built
on informal exchanges and mutually beneficial but less-than-transparent
arrangements. Employers avoid potentially costly labor and employment
disputes and low-level DHS officials can meet their quotas and bolster their
removal numbers.
This collaboration has exacted a price that exceeds what we typically might
expect of regulatory failure. To be sure, IRCA has failed to exclude
unauthorized immigrants from the workplace, leaving the larger goal of
deterring unauthorized migration hobbled and unfulfilled. But more than this,
IRCA’s nonenforcement has diluted the potency of labor and employment
protections; discouraged unauthorized immigrants from taking an investment in
the workplace; and strained already-tenuous cross-racial relationships in
regions not yet accustomed to new Latino immigration. And while we may
debate whether any of these costs are really too steep to bear, that too must be
considered a cost of this collaboration. Because employers can deploy their
immigration authority without any public oversight or scrutiny, the public lacks
even a basic descriptive understanding to engage in the thornier normative
aspects of immigration policy.
III. ACCOUNTABILITY AND SCREENING DECISIONS
If employer decisions have generated difficult and in some cases perverse
immigration consequences, then we should consider regulating our nation’s
employers as we would other categories of immigration decision makers.
Where decision-making authority finds its way into private hands, public
oversight should follow. As a first step, we must send the right signals. As
Kenneth Bamberger observes:
The simplest way to reproduce the attentional effect of an external shock is to
instruct a decisionmaker, at a discrete point in time, to focus on a particular
decision. . . . Making individuals personally accountable for tasks signals the
importance of the task and fosters a sense of responsibility for the outcome. 131

131. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 440
(2006).
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In the context of regulating unauthorized immigrants in the workplace,
sending the right signals means shifting our focus. Our immigration laws focus
exclusively on employer hiring decisions. But given the difficulties of
regulating those decisions and employers’ incentives to cheat, I want to suggest
that increasing accountability in the workplace also means focusing on
employer reporting decisions. We must prevent employers from reporting (or
threatening to report) unauthorized immigrants in order to disrupt the
suppression of labor and employment rights, and the undermining of citizennoncitizen solidarity. Our immigration regime should send the signal that
employers who abuse their power in this way will be held accountable and
punished.
A. Legal and Democratic Accountability
The DHS’s approach to sharing screening responsibilities with
nonimmigration entities reflects the urgency with which it approaches the
challenge of regulating unauthorized immigration. By compelling employers to
verify the immigration status of their employees, Congress hoped to obviate the
need for deportation—including the procedural formalities, and hence costs that
come with it—by creating a regime that proceeded by self-execution. If interior
enforcement responsibilities remained an exclusively public responsibility,
regulating unauthorized immigrants in the workplace would require a massive
reallocation of public resources towards investigating, charging, and
prosecuting workplaces, a task Congress has long understood as impossible to
execute. In the debate leading up to IRCA’s passage, for example, the Senate
report noted:
Reliance on direct enforcement alone would require massive increases in
enforcement in the interior—in both neighborhoods and workplaces—as well
as at the border. This would be more costly and intrusive, as well as less
effective, than a program which combines direct enforcement at reasonable
levels with a reduction in the incentives to enter the United States. 132

Such an enforcement strategy would require a significant investment in
time and resources, which ultimately detracts from the DHS’s efficacy as an
enforcement agency in other more high-stakes contexts.
Still, this informal partnership raises some troubling consequences. The
reality is that the DHS simply cannot handle the challenge alone. It has come to
rely on our nation’s employers in wading through its reporting backlog and in
strengthening its public image by more efficiently meeting quotas. Indeed, the
DHS, as a matter of enforcement policy, appears to conduct no random
worksite raids. Rather, it relies on frontline persons and entities to screen out
potentially removable immigrants so that all investigations and enforcement

132. IMMIGRATION REFORM & CONTROL, S. REP. NO. 98-62, at 8 (1983).
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efforts flow from “specific intelligence obtained from a variety of sources.” 133
The persistent kernel of discomfort embedded within all privatization schemes
is the potential for the private abuse of decision-making authority. “From the
public law perspective, unconstrained discretion is dangerous,” Jody Freeman
observes, because “[private] contractors make policy decisions rather than
merely implement the choices of politically accountable bodies.” 134 A fear that
troubles any society grounded in democratic principles remains the possibility
that its members will suffer a fate they had no opportunity or ability to
influence. 135 For precisely this reason, some argue against private prisons
because prison managers are incentivized to fill as many cells as possible,
rather than assessing whether the State’s legitimate interest in punishment has
been served. 136 Others worry that NGO workers might condition access to
humanitarian aid, such as food and supplies, on sexual favors. 137 Still others
caution that managed-care organizations might deny medically necessary
treatments to beneficiaries because such treatments are too expensive. 138 Thus,
anxiety over the potential accountability deficit wrought by privatizing services
lies at the center of much of privatization scholarship.
Public law scholars urge us to consider how abusive conditions would
affect the most vulnerable among us. If we look to the margins and shadows of
our communities, we must grapple with the reality that the failure to properly
deliver or administer certain services stands to produce dire consequences
“because those most directly affected by the services or failures to provide
services are politically and economically ineffectual. Treatment of vulnerable
populations simply does not work well in markets that depend upon consumer
rationality or upon political processes that demand active citizen
monitoring.” 139 Indeed, the contested services on which these marginalized
(and often poor and nonwhite) communities rely usually implicate a broader
debate that invites disagreement over the social meaning and community values
those services are supposed to embody. Determining what quality education
133. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 90.
134. Freeman, supra note 120, at 1344.
135. See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS 3 (2002). In describing the
challenges posed by public-private collaborations, specifically in the context of public
funding for services administered by religious groups, Minow observes: “What remains
troubling is the danger that the accumulation of specific decisions to privatize and to shift
relationships between government and religion may end up altering our lives in ways we
never have a chance to influence.” Id.
136. See Dolovich, supra note 124, at 462; see also Freeman, supra note 121, at 633
(“Private prison officials determine when infractions occur, impose punishments, and,
perhaps most significantly, make recommendations to parole boards.” (citations omitted)).
137. Dickinson, supra note 126, at 158.
138. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1383
(2003).
139. Minow, supra note 119, at 1262. For this reason, given the particular
vulnerability of prisoners, some have argued that prison management should never be
privatized. See Dolovich, supra note 124. But see Volokh, supra note 124.
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means is very difficult, and the quest for deciding the baseline of human dignity
that welfare benefits ought to enable offers no obvious conclusion. The
indeterminacies surrounding these ideas militate in favor of preserving control
over these ideas within the public sphere, so that they can be worked out
through collective decision-making channels. 140
Assessing the dangers of a particular privatization scheme can prove to be
difficult because State entities, not uncommonly, project romanticized notions
of accountability to justify the turn towards private decision making. For
example, during the 1970s, crime rates had been steadily rising in the United
Kingdom. In response, the UK engaged in a “responsibilization strategy” that
resituated the State within a world where it shared crime control responsibilities
with citizens and privately organized groups. Its mass-media campaign called
upon ordinary citizens to realize their own responsibilities in engaging this
matter of broad public concern. 141 But this campaign obfuscated the ways in
which privatization threatened to redistribute policing services in a manner that
ultimately harms the poorest and the least powerful, who are incapable of
acting “responsibly” by purchasing security services. 142 Indeed, accountability
itself is a lofty and vague idea, which can be deployed to serve contradictory
causes. Homeowners who hire security companies could plausibly argue that,
from their standpoint, privatization actually increases accountability. 143
Economic markets no less than public institutions, in the broadest sense, can
ensure accountability through the disciplining effects of the market, “which
tests the viability of ideas, products, and processes by their ability to attract and
maintain a sufficient number of purchasers to meet costs and generate desirable
profits.” 144

140. In creating a framework for identifying which types of privatization schemes
ought to be subject to public oversight and regulation, Jody Freeman argues: “From the
public law perspective, the inability to specify a task because it is value-laden, politically
contentious, and complex militates in favor of government provision or very strenuous
publicization efforts.” Freeman, supra note 120, at 1343. By “publicization,” Freeman means
the transfer of public duties to private entities under the condition that those private entities
“commit themselves to traditionally public goals as the price of access to lucrative
opportunities to deliver goods and services that might otherwise be provided directly by the
state.” Id. at 1285.
141. See David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime
Control in Contemporary Society, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445, 452-54 (1996). Garland
notes, “These campaigns, which involve extensive mass media advertising or else the mass
leafleting of households, aim to raise consciousness, create a sense of duty, and thus change
practices.” Id. at 452.
142. Garland observes that “[o]nce ‘security’ ceases to be guaranteed to all citizens by
a sovereign state, it tends to become a commodity, which, like any other, is distributed by
market forces rather than according to need.” Id. at 463.
143. David Alan Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89,
90 (2006).
144. Minow, supra note 119, at 1263.
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If the DHS’s primary mechanism for ensuring that employers faithfully
carry out their screening duties is the threat of sanctions, one might ask whether
we should apply sanctions more frequently and severely. In other words, if the
problem has been that the DHS has only sparingly enforced IRCA, why not
embrace a strategy where it regulated employer hiring decisions with vigor?
While this seems like a logical and intuitive regulatory turn, history has shown
that in this context, sanctions have proven to be an ineffective tool for adjusting
employer behavior. In the early years of IRCA’s implementation, for example,
a 1990 GAO report found that employers had engaged in a “widespread pattern
of discrimination” where even well-intentioned employers chose not to hire
U.S. citizens and otherwise authorized “foreign-appearing, foreign-sounding”
workers because it was simply easier not to hire than to run the risk of
sanctions. 145 Thus, sanctions have proven to be a blunt mechanism for
calibrating employer hiring practices. Too meek a threat of sanctions has led to
worker exploitation, and too substantial a threat has led to widespread
discrimination.
Unauthorized immigration is a complex phenomenon. Desperate to escape
poverty in their sending countries, immigrants work in this country to support
themselves and their families. Anxious to stay afloat in an increasingly
turbulent economy, employers hire unauthorized immigrants to gain a
bargaining advantage. Fearful of losing their jobs and simultaneously
dependent on cheap goods and services, American consumers remain confused
as to whether unauthorized immigrants help or hurt our economy. Given these
competing and conflicting interests, any immigration policy shift will involve
an inevitable set of trade-offs. But whatever distance separates Americans on a
fair and sensible immigration policy, one thing that most if not all can agree on
is that the exploitation of the most vulnerable among us advances no legitimate
immigration goal. Therefore, if employers are reporting unauthorized
immigrants as a way of avoiding liability for violations in the workplace—and
using the threat of reporting to maintain exploitative conditions—and if the
DHS is relying on employer reports as a way of identifying potentially
removable immigrants in the workplace, then any serious reform efforts will
require a shift in focus.
B. Proposed Remedies
In this Subpart, I discuss two specific remedies: (1) subjecting employers
who report unauthorized immigrants to the possibility of an audit, and
(2) threatening the use of the exclusionary rule against low-level DHS officials
who rely on such reports. Both of these remedies redirect our attention away

145. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS
QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 1, 3 (1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/
d24t8/140974.pdf.
AND THE
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from the front end, when employers hire unauthorized workers, to the back end,
when employers report workers. This shift is designed to signal to employers
and low-level DHS decision makers that they cannot reap benefits from the
suppression of dissent in the workplace and to remove the possibility of using
the DHS as an escape hatch from labor and employment law violations.
1. Auditing employer reports
In regulating employers, one modest solution might be to subject
employers to an audit, where the possibility of being audited attaches when the
employer reports to the DHS the presence of unauthorized immigrants.
Scrutinizing reporting, rather than or in addition to hiring decisions, will
encourage a change in behavior by employers who would otherwise usurp
IRCA’s screening authority for their own purposes. Presenting the threat of
being audited would raise another set of costs employers would have to
consider in hiring unauthorized workers. For some employers, these added
costs would be enough to sufficiently deter them from hiring unauthorized
immigrants at the outset—which is precisely what IRCA was designed to do in
the first place.
But the more urgent change that an audit could engender concerns those
employers who would persist in hiring unauthorized workers. It may be that a
particular industry suffers from a labor shortage and needs workers irrespective
of immigration status, or it may be that the employers possess a greater
familiarity and comfort and desire to hire workers from certain immigrant
communities. But whatever their reasons for hiring unauthorized workers,
having hired them, employers cannot then turn around and use the threat of
reporting as a way of exacting and escaping liability for exploitative workplace
practices. This type of regulatory regime would send the message that
exploitation will not be tolerated. Employers who knowingly recruit and hire
unauthorized immigrants will no longer be able to use State power to justify
low wages and unsafe workplace conditions. The possibility of an audit, which
is triggered only by reporting, would send the signal to an employer that once
she decides to hire an unauthorized immigrant, she will be no less subject to the
collective bargaining process. This would reduce the likelihood of abuse in the
workplace, because removing the possibility of workplace remedies
ameliorates some of the bargaining advantage of hiring unauthorized
immigrants.
Questions of institutional design can help calibrate the degree of
punishment that reporting raises. One modest version might be to shame
employers who engaged in reporting by publicly disclosing the results of the
audit. This type of shaming punishment, where the public learns that a
particular employer reported unauthorized workers as a form of retaliation,
would invite negative media attention and adverse actions by organizations
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representing labor and immigrant interests. 146 Another version might create an
information-sharing system between the DHS and labor-enforcement agencies
like the DOL and its state-level equivalents. Here, the DHS would pass along
these reports to agencies like the DOL, which would conduct initial
investigations. This too would send the message to employers that using State
power for personal gain will not be tolerated. 147 Still another version would
seek to monetarily punish employers, so that they would be subject both to any
liability for workplace violations—like backpay or the denial of overtime
pay—along with civil sanctions. A more robust version of this same idea might
be to create a private right of action for the aggrieved worker, so that the
unauthorized immigrant might be able to recover monetary damages or even a
temporary or permanent visa.
Of course, even if employers could no longer report unauthorized
immigrants, they would still be free to terminate them. 148 But if an employer
terminated a worker as a form of retaliation for organizing with her coworkers
or to recover unpaid wages and overtime pay, then that worker would be free to
pursue remedies in court. In this scenario, immigration-related issues such as
whether a particular worker had authorization to remain in the United States
would be inapposite. 149 Here, the threat of these labor- and employment-law
remedies would function as the accountability-ensuring mechanism by
beginning to correct the IRCA-engendered asymmetry that grants employers
whistleblower immunity regarding workers’ status but denies the same to
workers who are subject to employer lawlessness. 150
2. The exclusionary rule
Our reform efforts should target low-level DHS decision making as well.
Although employers have strong incentives to report unauthorized workers as a
way of avoiding liability in the workplace, low-level DHS officials have a
related incentive to rely on these reports to meet agency-imposed quotas. But
DHS officials should not obtain the benefit of employers and their exploitative

146. For an interesting exploration of the possibilities of using auditing to monitor
executive discretion, see Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227 (2006).
147. One interesting scenario might involve employers anonymously requesting the
inspection of the workplaces of their competitors. This involves an interesting
anticompetitive, rather than antiexploitation, rationale for the auditing system.
148. This is precisely the set of facts that caused Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883
(1984), to come before the Court.
149. Revoking IRCA’s employer sanctions provision would moot Hoffman Plastic
Compounds’s holding that IRCA prohibits unauthorized immigrant workers from pursuing
backpay. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147-49 (2002)
(explaining that IRCA changed the “legal landscape” by prohibiting whatever power the
NLRB had to order backpay awards to unauthorized immigrant workers).
150. See Preston, supra note 64, at A1.
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practices. One suggestion would be for immigration judges to apply the
exclusionary rule to any removal proceedings that rely on evidence obtained
from the type of employer reporting discussed above. At least one recent
immigration decision reflects this idea in principle. In re Herrera-Priego, an
unpublished immigration decision, involved precisely the sort of employer
reporting that has skewed the process by which immigrants are screened out of
the workplace. In Herrera-Priego, a garment factory owner denied the workers
overtime as required by law. When the workers filed grievances, the employer
discharged the workers who had filed complaints. As the labor dispute unfolded
and union representatives pressed for reinstatement of the aggrieved workers,
the employer, looking for an easy exit, contacted the INS to request a raid of
his own factory. The INS raided the factory, detained several workers for
deportation, and declined to sanction the employer in exchange for his
cooperation. 151 During removal proceedings, two of the workers successfully
suppressed evidence and terminated proceedings because the INS agents
violated an internal enforcement policy that required enforcement officers to
confirm whether a tip was proffered to quell a labor dispute. 152 Central to the
decision was the observation that the enforcement policy “was designed to
protect fundamental labor rights.” 153
Herrera-Priego hints at what kind of reform might be possible by sending
the right set of signals to employers. Instead of permitting employers to hire
unauthorized immigrants with the expectation that they can always report those
immigrants should the immigrants attempt to vindicate their workplace rights,
the principles embodied by Herrera-Priego foreclose reporting as an escape
hatch. This puts employers to a choice: either they screen for unauthorized
immigrants in good faith when making hiring choices, or they knowingly hire
unauthorized immigrants and face all of the limitations imposed by labor and
employment law.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have focused on the widespread problem of our nation’s
employers hiring and exploiting and reporting unauthorized immigrant
workers. This point matters, I have contended, because the identity of those
making immigration decisions affects the identities of those who ultimately join
our communities. Thinking about employers as private decision makers
presents an opportunity to reexamine a regime floating in a state of
151. In re Herrera-Priego, Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge (July 10,
2003) (on file with author).
152. Operations Instruction 287.3a provides that “whenever information received from
any source creates suspicion that an INS enforcement action might involve the Service in a
labor dispute, a reasonable attempt should be made by Service enforcement officers to
determine whether there is a labor dispute in progress.” Id. at 4.
153. Id. at 24.
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disrepair. 154 It seems that even immigrants who are authorized to work in the
United States with the primary objective of serving the greater American public
may quickly find themselves being coerced into doing work that benefits their
employers to the public’s detriment. 155 Moreover, recent reports of low-level
corruption within our nation’s immigration regime have been emerging; in one
particularly troubling incident, an immigration officer conditioned the
processing of an immigrant’s green card application on sexual favors. 156
Recent scholarship has empirically demonstrated the sheer arbitrariness of
asylum determinations, where the difference between life and death sometimes
turns on which judge is assigned a particular case. 157 All of these examples
suggest that problems of accountability pervade our immigration regime.
Developing levers for ensuring accountable decision making within the
workplace, therefore, is an important first step in bringing other areas of
immigration law in line.

154. David Sklansky argues that the “paramount benefit of studying private
security . . . is the new insight we can gain into old, familiar problems: the regulation of
public police, the limits of state action, and the affirmative duties of government.” David A.
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1171 (1999); see also Charlie Savage,
Nina Bernstein & Robert Gebeloff, Vetted Judges More Likely to Reject Asylum Bids, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at A17.
155. For example, under the J-1 visa system, foreign doctors who come to the United
States for further medical training are given the option of staying permanently if they agree
to provide medical care to poorer, underserved communities for a period of years. At the
conclusion of their service, these doctors are given the opportunity to obtain permanent
residency and eventually citizenship. But supervising physicians might direct the J-1 foreign
doctors away from the intended communities, and toward more affluent communities, where
they can perform more expensive procedures for patients with more comprehensive
insurance coverage. See Marshall Allen, Indentured Doctors, LAS VEGAS SUN, Sept. 30,
2007, at A1 (“There is a financial motive to work the foreign doctors long hours outside the
underserved areas: The J-1 doctor makes the most money for his boss by performing higherpaying procedures in hospitals or clinics that serve patients with good insurance coverage.
Or, J-1 doctors can be used to rake in revenue through multiple call shifts—12- or 24-hour
hospital assignments during which they admit and treat walk-in patients.”).
156. Nina Bernstein & Angelica Medaglia, An Agent, a Green Card, and a Demand
for Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, at A1.
157. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Phillip G. Schrag, Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2008).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1272238

S LEE 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103

1146

4/25/2009 1:46 PM

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1103

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1272238

